As the DRC faces its 17th Ebola outbreak and the African Development Bank releases $13 million, a judicial investigation is resurfacing. In 2018, World Bank emergency funds intended for the response were transformed into a cash cow. Same players, same emergency, same questions.
On July 20, the African Development Bank Group announced a $13 million grant to support the response to the 17th Ebola virus disease outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and Uganda. Caused by the Bundibugyo strain, which is particularly virulent and for which there is currently no approved vaccine, this outbreak has led the World Health Organization to activate its second level of international emergency alert. Of this funding, the DRC, the epicenter of the epidemic, is to receive eleven million dollars, distributed through the WHO.
A gesture of international solidarity, at first glance.
But for anyone who has been following the case pitting the Congolese justice system against the RAWJI family and former Inspector General of Finance Jules Alingete for several years, this announcement resonates like a chilling echo. Because in 2018, an Ebola epidemic and the international money mobilized to combat it had already crossed paths with the same protagonists. And the documents submitted to the court file describe a system of corruption, overbilling, and influence peddling that transformed the distress of a population into a commercial opportunity.
2018: When a Health Emergency Becomes a Profit
In June 2018, as part of the Health System Development Project (PDSS) financed by the World Bank, PRODIMPEX S.A.R.L. (a subsidiary of the RAWJI Group) won a contract to supply 143 Yamaha DT125 motorcycles for Ebola response teams. The contract was worth $584,810 excluding taxes, or $678,379.60 including taxes.
So far, nothing unusual. But what followed was.
An internal email dated June 7, 2018, from PRODIMPEX's financial director to Adnan RAWJI, details a hidden commission scheme: $500 per motorcycle, totaling $71,500, with 50% paid upon signing the contract and the balance upon receipt of the World Bank funds. The table attached to the message calculates a gross profit of $170,303, representing a margin of 33.18%. It also mentions a certain "Mr. DIOB," with a phone number, as the likely recipient of the commission.
Adnan RAWJI's response is shockingly cynical: "Have you tried reducing commissions or raising prices, because I know it's urgent for Ebola? We should try raising prices because I'm sure none of our competitors have stock like we do. Please raise the prices of Ebola Moto now due to the urgent need." A few minutes later, the financial director explains that the commission was negotiated down (they were asking for $700 per motorcycle, got $500) and that the unit price was increased from $3,800 to $3,900 to eliminate a competitor who was offering $2,800. He adds: “We will try to increase it to 10 to 15% where possible, because we also don’t want to miss such an opportunity.” For them, an epidemic is not a tragedy: it’s a business opportunity. Disease becomes a market; deaths become statistics; international aid becomes an accounting line item where percentages and commissions are added before the contract is signed.
The controller and those controlled: a systemic conflict of interest
This affair takes on a whole new dimension when we look at the person who was supposed to ensure the regularity of these contracts: Jules Alingete Key, then Inspector General of Finance (IGF).
On February 12, 2022, the Inspectorate General of Finance (IGF) submitted a damning report to the Minister of Health: over $300 million in funds allocated by the government and donors had allegedly been misappropriated from several health programs, including the PDSS (specifically, the program at the heart of the 143-motorcycle contract). Yet, to the investigators' knowledge, no public action, sanctions, or specific referral targeting PRODIMPEX or the intermediaries mentioned in the 2018 emails has been made public.
Why this silence? The documents submitted to the court file provide a troubling answer. Jules Alingete and his wife, Nanu Mukawa, are respectively the majority shareholder and manager of the accounting firm DACO Sarl. However, this firm allegedly began an assignment with PRODIMPEX and several companies in the RAWJI group as early as 2016, several years before the events of 2018 and while Mr. ALINGETE was serving as Inspector General of Finance.
In short: the man responsible for auditing the RAWJI group's tax and accounting compliance was also, through his wife's firm, the group's legal counsel.
Several journalistic investigations have documented the extent of this relationship. DACO Sarl allegedly assisted Beltexco, PRODIMPEX, Rawbank, Marsavco, Proton, Parkland, and RAFI—essentially the core of the RAWJI group—in strategies to reduce their tax burden, particularly on import VAT. The same sources cite significant discrepancies between the revenue figures declared to the tax authorities and those presented at shareholder meetings, resulting in an estimated tax shortfall for the entire group since 2016 of several hundred million dollars. The conflict of interest also reportedly surfaced in the differential treatment of two competing suppliers in Kinshasa's public lighting market in 2021: while SOLEKTRA, a less expensive and technically superior company, faced public accusations of overbilling from the General Inspectorate of Finance (IGF), no similar criticism was allegedly leveled against Proton, a subsidiary of the RAWJI group and a client of DACO Sarl, whose unit price was actually higher.
According to the same sources, it was amidst these revelations that the Presidency of the Republic ultimately removed Jules ALINGETE from his position as head of the IGF, a departure officially presented as a retirement.
A Justice System in Fluctuations
The most concerning aspect, however, remains the functioning of the Congolese justice system in this case.
Between November 2022 and March 2023, several detailed complaints were filed with the judicial authorities. According to reports, the magistrates initially assigned to the case were removed from it before the file was transferred to the Prosecutor General at the Court of Cassation. The proceedings were subsequently dismissed without a whistleblower's testimony being fully examined.
Then, on June 20, 2026, a dramatic turn of events occurred: Prosecutor General Firmin Mvonde Mambu ordered a travel ban on several individuals—including the brothers Mustafa, Mazhar, Uzair, and Zain RAWJI, Jules Alingete, his wife Nanu Mukawa, as well as Kiala Ndombele and Jok Oga Ukelo. The investigation concerns alleged acts of corruption, forgery, and money laundering.
Less than two weeks later, an official statement from the Prosecutor General's office indicated that the investigation had progressed and that it was premature to establish the guilt of the individuals targeted, as proof of their involvement had not yet been established. The prosecutor clarified that the precautionary measure had been lifted even before the letter circulated on social media, and that the investigation remained in its preliminary stages. He also revealed that some of the allegations had already been examined in previous, dismissed proceedings.
How can we explain that a case closed several years ago is suddenly subject to coercive measures before a new statement downplays its significance? What new evidence has emerged in the meantime? What investigations have been carried out?
These questions deserve precise answers. The credibility of a justice system rests as much on its independence as on the consistency of its decisions.
2026: Could the same scenario repeat itself?
Eight years after the PDSS affair, history is catching up with current events. As eleven million dollars are about to be committed to the DRC in the name of the same emergency—an Ebola epidemic—the questions that the 2018 case should have resolved are resurfacing with burning relevance. The same structural vulnerabilities remain: emergency procedures that bypass standard controls, a multitude of intermediaries between the donor, the Ministry of Health, and suppliers, chronic weakness in ex-post oversight, and a judiciary whose independence and consistency are themselves questionable.
Several questions arise even before the AfDB funds are fully disbursed:
- What procurement mechanisms will govern the use of the eleven million dollars allocated to the DRC?
- Does the AfDB and the WHO, the announced implementing partners of the funding, plan an independent audit, either in real time or after the fact?
- Have the Congolese authorities and technical and financial partners learned from the PDSS case (particularly the lack of sanctions and the dismissal of the initial report)?
- What transparency will be ensured regarding the identity of selected suppliers and the profit margins applied, in a context where certain actors already implicated in corruption cases continue to operate in the medical and logistics supply market in the DRC?
“They no longer want to own businesses, they want to own the state.”
Beyond the individuals implicated, it is a system that is being called into question. The RAWJI family is no longer simply seeking to profit from public contracts. They are not trying to persuade those in power: they are buying them. They are not trying to influence the judiciary: they intend to replace it.
In their eyes, a minister is an investment. A judge is a risk. A prosecutor is an obstacle to be circumvented. A Congolese citizen is merely a negligible variable.
The Democratic Republic of Congo needs a justice system that decides cases based on evidence, explains its decisions, and resists influence of any kind. When citizens no longer understand judicial decisions, it is not just a procedure that falters: it is trust in the state itself that erodes.
Without clear and verifiable answers, the risk is not only financial: it is, once again, the trust of donors and the Congolese people that would be tested, at the very moment when an epidemic demands unwavering mobilization.
It is time for a full investigation, both into the PDSS affair and the future use of AfDB funds, to be conducted through an independent, impartial, and transparent inquiry.